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Yaqui Resistance in Sonora and Yucatan 
Towards the End of the Porfiriato 
Over centuries, the Sonoran Yaquis behavior can best be described as 
non-conformist. The first contacts between Yaquis and Spaniards on 
the Pacific coast of Mexico occurred around the year 1533. The 
Yaquis, who call themselves yoreme, were originally loosely organ-
ized into scattered semi-permanent settlements, numbering approxi-
mately 80 different rancherías. The area they occupied was about 60 
miles long and 15 miles wide on both sides of the Yaqui River, which 
flows from the mountains of Northwest Mexico to the Pacific. This 
traditional Yaqui homeland was known among them as ýaquimi. The 
primary weapons of the Yoreme were bows and arrows.  
The early contacts between Yoreme and Spaniards alternated be-
tween hostility and friendship  depending on the conduct of the colo-
nists and also on practical assessments by the Yaquis. They profited 
from the Habsburgs neglect of New Spains northwest frontier. Be-
tween 1533 and 1617, the Yaquis managed to survive the sporadic 
encounters with the Europeans. At the time, the Yaquis probably 
numbered about 30,000 people (Hu-DeHart 1984: 12). In 1617 the 
Yoreme accepted the Jesuits among them, and the missionaries hence-
forth remodeled Yaqui society and gave it a rigid new cohesive struc-
ture.1 Under Jesuit tutelage, the eighty or so formerly independent 
ranchería hamlets were transformed into eight tightly structured 
towns, each eventually supervised by a priest.2 This reorganization by 
the padres was important for two reasons: first it improved local pro-
duction and made the Yoreme economically self-sufficient, and sec-
ondly it gave them a heightened sense of political and cultural identity 
                                                     
1  For a more detailed account see Hausberger (2000: 97-100). 
2  In the very beginning, however, there were only two priests (Hu-DeHart 1984: 
13). 
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that seemed to be of vital importance in the future. For over a hundred 
years these arrangements seem to have worked fairly well.3  
Still, Jesuit control was not necessarily always harmonious, as the 
1740 uprising against some of the padres proves.4 The uprising was a 
signal that the Yoreme were unwilling to accept just any treatment by 
the missionaries. And the now prospering frontier economy, with its 
mines and haciendas offered the Yaquis multiple opportunities to 
work outside of their traditional territory on the Río Yaqui, which they 
intended to take. Among the grievances the Yoreme representatives 
uttered as early as 1736 was that they wanted to be allowed to carry 
their traditional weapons. They also argued against the missionaries 
taking away their land. And they wanted to elect their traditional au-
thorities themselves and not be forced to accept the friars choices in 
this respect. Among the many grievances stated, these are the ones to 
reappear again and again over the course of three centuries.5  
After the Jesuits were expelled from Spanish America in 1767, the 
Yaqui communities  unlike other missions  did not fall apart. They 
intensified their work on haciendas and in mines outside of their terri-
tory, becoming an indispensable source of labor especially for the 
mines.6 Although there naturally may have been disagreements among 
the Yoreme, they always shared one belief in questions of autonomy. 
In their territory there would be only Yaquis, and they always distin-
guished between their own government and the colonial, and later, the 
Mexican authority.7 Through the application of that attitude they man-
aged to keep outsiders from settling among them. While the Bourbon 
authorities attempted to extract tribute from the Yaquis, they eventu-
ally settled for their surplus labor instead, something the Yaquis gave 
                                                     
3  The Jesuits were not very content with the continuous coming and going of the 
Yaquis (Hausberger 2000: 70-71). 
4  See the corresponding sections of Hausberger (2000). 
5  The uprising did not last long and neither did it bring many changes. It did not 
establish a system of payments of tribute to colonial authorities, as the governor 
had suggested at one point. It showed that the Yaquis did value the exemption 
from tribute and the protection they received through the Jesuits.  
6  They had been taking work outside of the missions before, in spite of the Jesuits 
who would have preferred to have the only contacts between Yaquis and Spanish 
colonists to be made through themselves. 
7  The Yaquis wanted political as well as cultural separation (Hu-DeHart 1988: 
156). 
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willingly. Thus, a balance was achieved between the demands of the 
state and the vecinos, and the aims and goals of the Yoreme them-
selves. 
This fragile balance lasted through Independence (1810-1821), 
which extended citizenship to all Indians. This, the Yoreme did not 
acknowledge at all (Hu-DeHart 1984: 19). What they again claimed 
for themselves was the sole ownership of the Yaqui territory in one 
piece. They could not be coerced into paying taxes or serving in the 
military. If need arose, they took up arms against the Mexicans. And 
especially since many Yaquis had returned to their pueblos after the 
post-Independence decline of the mines, they were a force to be reck-
oned with. It took the government several years to deal with the rebel-
lion by the Yaqui known as Juan Banderas in the 1820s and early 
1830s. During this rebellion, the by then familiar demands were 
voiced once again. The Yaquis wanted the retreat of all troops from 
the Yaqui River, and to be recognized as sole and undisputed owners 
of their land. They insisted that the yori-families, the name the 
Yoreme used for non-Yaquis, having fled the river should not return.  
It was during this time that the Yoreme first experienced deporta-
tions. Frustrated by their own inability to win, the government forces 
treatment of the Yaquis taken prisoner became more and more ruth-
less. Many were executed on the spot, while others were sent to Mex-
ico City. Supposedly the latter were to be tried in court for their 
crimes but they were really drafted into the marines of Veracruz 
(Hu-DeHart 1984: 29). This was the first documented case of depor-
tation, a punishment which was meted out sporadically during the next 
few decades but which became a major policy at the end of the cen-
tury (Hu-DeHart 1984: 29). 
Even though Banderas was eventually arrested and executed and 
the Yaqui resistance subsided for a while, the problem of pacifying or 
reining in the Yoreme remained unsolved when Porfirio Díaz came to 
power in Mexico in 1876. At the time, the Yaqui resistance had al-
ready acquired a new leader, a Yaqui known as Cajeme. The govern-
ment had actually sent him back to the Yaquis in yet another attempt 
to appease them. As it turned out, he was to do quite the contrary. 
Cajeme started yet another rebellion in 1875 and during this time, 
significant changes were introduced into Yaqui society. Using a 
combination of Yaqui traditions and what he had learned from the 
Claudia Haake 348
Mexicans, Cajeme disciplined his people to rely on their own re-
sources, initiative and leadership, rather than to work for, pillage from, 
or ally with, outsiders (Hu-DeHart 1988: 160).  
Essentially, this rebellion was a defensive one, its object merely to 
keep the traditional territory and to strengthen and preserve Yaqui 
autonomy. The goals were clear and at the same time very traditional. 
The rebellion came at a time when Sonora was already torn over an 
election. Threatening to rebel if his message was not heeded, Cajeme 
announced he would not recognize the government unless the Yoreme 
were granted total freedom to govern themselves, because they were 
the natural owners of the Yaqui River (Hu-DeHart 1993: 143). It 
was during this revolt that the Yaquis were closest to complete isola-
tion. They hardly worked outside their territory and they did not take 
any allies this time. Still the Yaquis never did shut themselves off 
entirely since they needed the contacts to the outside, especially to 
obtain weapons.  
The Yaqui tradition of not isolating themselves entirely from the 
outside world, while claiming the right to autonomy, as Hu-DeHart 
(1988: 160) has termed it, created something like a state within a state, 
a nation within, that was unacceptable to the Porfiristas who had come 
to power in Sonora in 1879. Hence, they attempted both to crush the 
Yoreme using military means and to colonize and develop their lands. 
In the 1880s Yaqui and Mayo lands were declared terrenos baldíos 
and, because the Indians were unable to produce recorded titles to 
their property, their lands were surveyed and sold (Hatfield 1998: 7).8 
Naturally, the Yoreme did not just accept this. They were set on 
autonomy, self-reliance, and self-sufficiency. 
The ensuing Yaqui wars lasted twelve years in spite of the serious 
interest and involvement of federal forces. It was hard to defeat the 
Yaquis under Cajeme, who was eventually apprehended and executed 
by a firing squad on 21 April, 1887, mainly because the territory, the 
Sierra de Bacatete where they went to hide, was so difficult.9 Further-
more, the climatic conditions were very hard on people unused to 
                                                     
8  This declaring the lands to be terrenos baldíos, empty, vacant lands, was done on 
the basis of the so-called Ley Lerdo, passed in 1856, but a fair amount of land 
had remained untouched until Díaz came to power. 
9  After having been marched through all the Yaqui pueblos, Cajeme was executed 
by a firing squad. 
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them and even on the animals used in the campaigns. Greatly superior 
strength was needed to finally defeat the Yaquis and the government 
came out of this conflict badly embarrassed in military matters. Their 
status as an important labor force may have saved the Yaquis from 
more severe measures at the time. 
Even after the defeat and the death of Cajeme in 1887 the resist-
ance of the Yaqui tribe remained solid in spite of the governments 
hopes of having finally pacified them. Now the Indians carried on 
with the battle by means of guerrilla warfare. According to the gov-
ernments intention they were to keep as much of their land as they 
could cultivate themselves and the remainder was to be put to other 
uses by other people. Few Yaquis were willing to accept the option of 
working their traditional land as mere colonists. The mass exodus of 
Yaquis that followed Cajemes defeat amounted to a self-imposed 
exile that would have been acceptable to the government as a final 
solution to the Yaqui problem had it entailed no other consequences 
(Hu-DeHart 1988: 163). Rather, in once again opting for wage labor 
they adapted their resistance to yet another change in the prevailing 
circumstances. The by now accustomed raiding and hit-and-run at-
tacks were kept up, only now as a form of exclusive guerrilla warfare, 
at first under the leadership of the Yaqui Juan Maldonado, better 
known under his war name Tetabiate. The Yoreme who worked out-
side of Yaquimi now functioned as a base for the active resistance of 
the so-called broncos, the hard core of rebels. Although only a minor-
ity was actually involved actively in the fighting, almost every Yaqui 
had a part in this struggle. The so-called pacíficos or mansos sup-
ported the broncos and made it hard, if not impossible, for the Mexi-
can forces to overcome the armed resistance fueled by the peaceful 
members of the tribe. The money they made went into weapons  
usually into high-calls American manufactured ones.10 Furthermore, 
the rebels sometimes went to the haciendas to rest and recharge while 
former workers took their part in the fight.11 This constant exchange 
                                                     
10  The border to Arizona was strictly patrolled and the Americans involved in the 
attempt to keep guns and ammunition from the Yaquis. See for example AHGES, 
tomo 1794 (1903) and 1881 (1904). 
11  Rebels went to haciendas to recharge or switch places with the pacíficos. See for 
instance AHGES, tomo 1700 (1902) and 1794 (1903). See also various refer-
ences in newspaper articles as collected in INAH, primarily in Sonora 8. See also 
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prevented the military from effectively isolating the rebels from the 
other Yoreme. In a way, almost every Yaqui was a rebel. Thus it 
proved to be next to impossible to dry-up the social base supporting 
and replenishing the rebels so that the Sonoran and the federal gov-
ernment in the end arrived at deportation as the only option left to 
them.  
At some time during the campaign against the Yaquis, deportation 
of captured rebels was introduced as a measure.12 This practice had 
been applied before if only in very few cases. Male Yaquis were taken 
to the South of Mexico and drafted into the army. Some women and 
children supposedly were sent into labor gangs (Hu-DeHart 1984: 
132).  
Eventually, rebel chief Tetabiate gave signs of interest in a peace-
ful solution of the conflict. An unconditional peace agreement was 
signed on May 15, 1897 at Ortiz. It proved to be short-lived, holding 
for only two years. But the peace of Ortiz sent over 6,000 Yaquis back 
to the river within the following two years. As Hu-DeHart (1984: 138) 
puts it, this mass migration back to the Yaqui  poignantly illus-
trated the desire of Yaquis to return home after a long sojourn out-
side. But this happened on a set of unwritten premises like the 
aforementioned withdrawal of troops. And when their expectations 
were not met and more and more white colonists settled within their 
territory, the Yoreme again took up arms in July 1899, a mere two 
years after the signing of the peace of Ortiz. However, this time 
around the fighting did not go very well for the Yaquis and they suf-
fered many losses and defeats. 
The government forces came up to almost 5,000 men  greatly su-
perior to the rebel strength. Additional measures were reintroduced or 
more strictly enforced than before. For instance, the hacendados were 
by law required to keep a register of their Yaqui workers and to detain 
all suspects of being rebels. Yaquis were only to live in designated 
areas. Any Yoreme was supposed to carry a passport with him, the so-
called salvoconducto.13 Indios sospechosos, suspects, were kept 
                                                                                                                  
CEHM CONDUMEX, Col. B. Reyes, carpeta 34, legajo 6738; and AHUIA, Col. 
P. Díaz, L15: Letter from Corral to Díaz, June 14, 1890. 
12  According to Hu-DeHart (1984: 132) this happened between 1895 and 1897.  
13  See for instance AHGES, tomo 1632 (1901) or 1700 (1902). 
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under surveillance.14 Many Yaqui living quarters were searched for 
guns and ammunition.15 And the deportations were stepped up. 
While none of these measures managed to effect the Yaquis sur-
render they did reduce the number of active rebels to about 300. In 
one encounter Tetabiate was killed. And while one could still not 
speak of a complete victory of the government forces the campaign 
was called off on August 31, 1901. What was thought to be a limited 
clean-up program aimed at 150 to 300 rebels was left to the state gov-
ernment of Sonora. The latter put together a surveillance program and 
established compulsory Yaqui registers.16 The passport system proved 
ineffective since the rebels often borrowed papers or even obtained 
work without them. The Sonoran hacendados were desperate for 
workers and therefore even willing to break the law to get them.17  
When these measures did not work out even after two years, the 
government saw its only remaining chance in drying up the social 
base of the rebels, concluding that without it the fighting would neces-
sarily cease. Moreover, it was far easier to deal with the visible, rela-
tively stable working population than with the ghost-like rebels in 
the sierra (Hu-DeHart 1984: 156) Consequently, between 1902 and 
1904, several hundred Yoreme, men, women, children, were rounded 
up and subsequently jailed. At this time it was still official policy to 
deport only hardcore rebels though this was not followed strictly. 
Some women and children were also deported; some men hanged or 
sentenced to other punishments. 
It was partly the commercial interest from the United States, espe-
cially from Arizona, that inspired the Mexican government to finally 
rid itself of the Yaqui nuisance and open the way for commercial 
agricultural development of the area. This was so ironical because 
without the Yaquis and their labor the very same development would 
in all likelihood been much slower in taking off. Additionally, the 
Yaquis suffered from technical innovations, especially from the ad-
vance of railroads. At first, they were convenient for this develop-
ment, supplying mines, railroads, industries, but most of all the ex-
                                                     
14  See AHGES, tomo 1632 (1901). 
15  See AHGES, tomo 1552 (1900). 
16  See AHGES, tomo 1700 (1902). 
17  See for instance the case of the Maytorenas who were caught smuggling Yaquis. 
See AHGES, tomo 2316 (1908). 
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panding agriculture, with cheap labor. But then the already mentioned 
need for labor on the henequen plantations counteracted the need of 
Yaqui labor in Sonora. The hacendados of the province had been will-
ing to balance the need for the Yaqui labor force against the fear of 
attacks and until that point the government had agreed with that. But 
now they could have both; they could deport the Yoreme and at the 
same time satisfy labor needs  only not Sonoras.  
Yet even the draconian policy of deporting the Yoreme did not 
bring forth the desired results. The rebels still held out and kept up 
their resistance. In their attempts to evade capture they roamed an 
even wider area than before. Raids and plunder sustained them along 
with what the by now severely restricted mansos could muster. Any 
attempts the Yaquis made to obtain peace failed  most likely because 
they still made the traditional demands. 
The prisoners obtained in the campaign and its various measures 
were usually taken to Hermosillo and then to Guaymas to be shipped 
to their future destinations.18 Most were jailed repeatedly or put into 
guarded camps where they awaited their fate and quite possibly their 
deportation from Sonora. Judging from the frequent deaths, the condi-
tions inside the prisons must have been very harsh. By 1904 the 
deportations had increased very much, were an obvious threat to the 
tribe. In 1904 alone, the official correspondence mentions 822 Yaquis 
to be deported or to have been deported already.19 In 1908, the number 
came up to 1198.20 As destinations, both Yucatan and Oaxaca were 
given, but the former decidedly more than the latter. Infinitely more of 
the Yoreme may have already been sent or were supposed to go later 
on: They may also have been imprisoned at the time or sent some-
where to work, or were even released. And in the whole venture that 
removal was, the decision of who went and who stayed was not al-
ways a logical one. Some who admitted to be involved in the rebellion 
were let go while others, even children, were deported. And even 
                                                     
18  See for instance AHGES, tomos 1881 (1904), 1984 (1905), 2077 (1906), 2078 
(1906), 2193 (1907), 2313 (1908), 2663 (1911). 
19  See AHGES, tomos 1881 (1904) and 1882 (1904). Unfortunately, the data are not 
as rich in other years, except for 1908.  
20  See AHGES, tomos 2313 (1908), 2314 (1908), 2315 (1908), and 2316 (1908). 
The above number refers to Yucatan and, in a few cases, to an unspecified desti-
nation, not to Oaxaca. 
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those of the Yoreme who had fought for the government were not 
necessarily safe from deportation. A few men were always hanged 
though it is impossible to tell from the source material why some were 
selected for this punishment and others went free. Historian Alan 
Knight (1986: 79) consequently has termed the fight against the 
Yaquis a crusade. 
In view of the rebels success in still somehow eluding apprehen-
sion and castigation or deportation, the governments step to by 1907 
adopt deportation as the official policy becomes almost logical 
(Hu-DeHart 1984: 180).21 It is not evident from the sources available 
who was behind this decision or the idea behind the program.22 How-
ever, it is startling that some areas of the project are so well docu-
mented through official governmental and military correspondence 
while others remain almost entirely in the dark. This is probably due 
to the fact that certain government officials (ab)used their positions for 
some kind of semi-private enterprise. They could justify the deporta-
tions to the federal government as a necessary cleanup-program while 
at the same time personally benefiting from sending the Yaquis to 
Yucatan.23 The henequen industry on Yucatan was booming and 
therefore for the federal government of higher importance than the 
Sonoran economy. 
                                                     
21  Many officials were of the opinion that only the Yaquis elimination from Sonora 
could bring peace to the state. See CEHM CONDUMEX, Col. R. Corral, carpeta 
1/3, legajo 30: Letter from Alberto Cubillas to Ramón Corral, September 1908. 
22  Hu-DeHart (1984: 180) speaks of the ruling elites of Sonora and Yucatan. She 
is referring to Olegario Molina, Ramón Corral, Luis Torres, and Rafael Izábal. 
Raquel Padilla Ramos (1995: 105) analyzes this further. I have found no reason 
to doubt their conclusions even though they do not explain why some Yaquis we-
re sent to Oaxaca rather than to Yucatan. However, the information that can be 
found in the archives in Sonora and Yucatan is rather sketchy and confusing. The 
apprehension and the rounding up of Yaquis clearly seems to have fallen among 
the responsibilities assigned to various Sonoran government officials like the pre-
fects. Troops were used to guard the captives and the latter were often kept in 
prisons. The official correspondence also points to a governmental involvement 
in the organization of the shipment of Yaquis at least to their first stopover on 
their way to Yucatan. See AHGES, tomos 2319 (1908), 2077/78 (1906), 2193 
(1907). 
23  Yucatans henequen plantations were in constant demand of cheap labor. During 
the first decade of the twentieth century henequen had become one of the largest 
exports of Mexico and had thus made the owners of the vast plantations very in-
fluential. 
Claudia Haake 354
The peak of these deportations may have been around the year 
1908. Exact numbers are not known but it seems to be certain that 
thousands of Yaquis  and not only Yaquis but also other Indians  
were removed from their homes this way. Raquel Padilla Ramos 
(1995: 115-118, 130), as a preliminary estimate, mentions a number of 
over 6,000 Yaqui deportees to Yucatan alone.24 Other estimates for 
the period between 1902 and 1908 run as high as 15,000.25 Even as-
suming a population of 30,000 Yoreme on the eve of the deportations, 
which is one of the higher estimates, that would still mean that they 
lost between one-fourth and one-half of the entire Sonoran Yaqui 
population. And these numbers do not even include the ones who es-
caped over the border to the United States or those who had died. 
Generally the apprehension of the Yoreme seems to have been fol-
lowed by their transfer into special camps or by imprisonment. They 
were then shipped by boat from Guyamas down the coast, marched 
across the width of Mexico in order to be shipped again to Yucatan, 
their final destination.  
By 1908, the deportations had taken their final toll on the rebel-
lion, they had removed the base that had supported the whole venture. 
The same year, a delegation of Yaquis approached the officials for 
peace  under the traditional conditions of keeping their arms while 
keeping intruders out. It is telling that these Yaquis were pacíficos and 
not rebels (Hu-DeHart 1984: 182). Not surprisingly the government 
refused these demands, but the negotiations were kept up.  
Subsequently, in May of 1908, government representatives met 
with the rebel chieftain Luis Bule. They required complete submission 
to the government and disarmament. Bule accepted the conditions but 
also asked about the return of the Yoreme who had been deported to 
Yucatan.26 Furthermore, he refused to accept any of the proposed con-
                                                     
24  Her main sources are newspapers.  
25  The total number of deportees from the Yaqui tribe has never been officially 
tabulated. Estimates for the period between 1902 and 1908 range from 8,000 to 
about 15,000. It is also next to impossible to estimate the total number of Yaquis 
at the eve of the deportation, due to wide dispersal, wars, and a generally high 
mobility (Tronosco 1977: 265). 
26  En seguida manifestaron que les trajeron las familias de ellos que estaban en 
Yucatán y se les manifestó que después de sometidos podían solicitarlo del Go-
bierno, el que resolvería lo conveniente, con lo que también quedaron confor-
mes; AHGES, tomo 2315 (1908). See Hu-DeHart (1984: 184).  
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ditions and he asked for time to gather the parientes.27 Unfortunately, 
as Bule did not represent all the Yaquis, he could not convince them to 
surrender and so the deadline to turn over the weapons could not be 
met. Infuriated, the government once again enforced the deporta-
tions.28  
The largest shipments probably took place in June and July of 
1908. The only exceptions made were for small Yaqui orphans, 
brought up in non-Yaqui families, not speaking any Yaqui. Almost all 
others were pursued relentlessly. The Vice-President and the Secretary 
of War had decreed that all Yaquis, sin excepción, were to be re-
moved from Sonora.29 In July the Secretary of War made it known to 
the Yaquis that for every attack 500 of them would be deported to 
Yucatan.30 This was to be communicated to the mansos so they would 
relate the news to the rebels. 
The massive embarkations of Yaquis stopped abruptly at the end 
of July but smaller numbers continued to be deported. There were also 
still prices on the heads of Yaquis but by the end of this month the so-
called concentration of pacíficos was considered complete.31 Maybe 
the slowdown in the deportations was due to the decrease in labor 
demand in Yucatan. The henequen market depended largely on export 
and also suffered from the depression in the United States, possibly 
having a beneficial effect for the Yaquis. 
In late August of 1908, Bule and his second-in-command formally 
agreed to the peace conditions from May. But, as it turned out, once 
again not all his people backed Bule. And even though the initial talks 
seem to have gone well the Yaquis later insisted on keeping their 
arms, asked for guarantees for their lives and for the return of the de-
ported parientes.32 Life guarantees were given under the condition of 
the complete submission of the Yaquis and only a few of them were to 
                                                     
27  See AHGES, tomo 2315 (1908).  
28  See AHGES, tomo 2316 (1908). 
29  See AHGES, tomo 2316 (1908). 
30  See AHGES, tomo 2315 (1908). 
31  See AHGES, tomo 2315 (1908). 
32  Pidieron que se les permitiera á los que fueron deportados á Yucatán última-
mente que regresaran; á esto contestó el Señor Gobernador que el regreso de los 
de Yucatán depende de la conducta que éstos observen aquí; AHGES, tomo 
2316 (1908). See also CEHM CONDUMEX, Col. R. Corral, carpeta 1/3, legajo 
4: Letter from Alberto Cubillas, Secretarian, to Ramón Corral, May 4, 1908. 
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keep their weapons. They were also told that the return of the depor-
tees depended entirely on the conduct of the Sonoran Yaquis. The 
government refused to make any further concessions.  
In January of 1909, Luis Bule and some 180 rebels did agree to 
the original peace conditions and were disarmed. The deportees to 
Yucatan remained unmentioned. But even before the conclusion of the 
meeting the government representatives present had doubts about the 
validity of the peace agreement for the Yaquis as a tribe, since not all 
the rebels had come together for the occasion. They were soon to find 
out that they had been correct in this assumption. For the time being, 
however, Luis Bule and some of his men were incorporated into the 
government troops as a special auxiliary force. Bule seems to have 
honestly tried to fulfill his promises and repeatedly sent letters to the 
rebels still in the sierra. However, only occasionally did a few men 
come down from the mountains. Luis Espinosa, one of Bules old 
comrades, commanded the last faction holding out there. But probably 
since the remaining rebels were few in number and did not constitute 
much of a problem, the troops only went after the small groups com-
ing out of the sierra instead of risking a pursuit in the difficult moun-
tainous terrain. Not much of this situation changed in 1910. Compared 
to previous years, the whole area did indeed appear tranquil with no 
one but the Espinosa faction occasionally causing trouble. The other 
Yoreme stayed quiet. 
Apparently, the governments efforts were finally paying off. 
Had it not been for the Mexican Revolution which terminated the 
Díaz regime in 1911, it might have succeeded in isolating the 
Espinosa faction from the rest of the Yaqui people, ultimately destroy-
ing it (Hu-DeHart 1984: 197). Indeed, as early as 1910, the shadow 
of the revolution may have relieved the rebels a little. In the end, the 
Yaqui tribe was saved from complete disintegration by the outbreak of 
the Mexican Revolution, because it enabled some of them to go back 
to their original homes. Still, Friedrich Katz (1991: 91) has concluded 
that overall the Yaquis offered the greatest resistance to Profirian 
modernization. They constituted a traditional sector in the sense that 
they clung to their established rights and lands (Katz 1991: 91). And 
they clung to these things successfully, although that also meant the 
forced sacrifice of some tribal members, by death or by removal. 
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As seen, the Yaquis almost always seemed willing to rise up for 
their demands. Even in times of peace, the situation was never re-
laxed, but there were processes of adjustment and negotiation, which 
often again resulted in armed conflicts. Thus over time, an uneasy 
balance of power developed, in which the Yaquis managed to hold 
their own for a long time.  
In the conflicts explored, the Yaquis proved that they considered 
themselves to be outside of the social hierarchy envisioned by the 
government. It becomes evident by their steadfast attempts to resist 
incorporation and the taking of their lands. The latter did not meet 
with complete success and there were some land losses and en-
croachment. However, the Yaquis retained something like an autono-
mous space, both in a metaphorical way  their separateness and 
autonomy  and also in a very tangible, practical way  the territory 
they themselves called Yaquimi. But this is only one story, the Sono-
ran one. What happened in Yucatan was an entirely different story. 
While resistance never did cease in Sonora, it was suspiciously 
lacking among those Yaquis deported to Yucatan. That is a strange 
thing to encounter when Yaquis are concerned. The Yucatecan 
sources rarely mention the Yaquis and when they do, it is mostly in 
cases of them having contracted Yellow Fever. Apart from those in-
stances, Yaquis only appear in a few court cases. Such a almost com-
plete silence seems out of place with the Yaquis  but then, the Yaqui 
deportees were out of place in Yucatan.  
Hardly a trace can be found about the Yaquis on Yucatan and the 
largest part of the information available is due to the fact that a size-
able number of them at one time suffered from Yellow Fever.33 Yu-
catecan officials were desperately trying to curb outbreaks of the 
much-feared disease, also known as the Black Vomit. So what can be 
found out about the lives of the Yucatecan Yoreme is mostly about 
sickness and death. What can be discovered is a far cry from what 
continued to take place in Sonora at the same time. In their native 
                                                     
33  The Yellow Fever is a disease contracted and spread through the bite of a mos-
quito. The first symptoms are fever, headaches, backaches, and nausea. The dis-
ease reduces the number of the white blood cells and causes hemorrhages. It is 
also known as Black Vomit (vómito prieto) because the patients in an ad-
vanced stage of the disease start to bleed from the nose and mouth. In its final 
stage, the patient turns yellow.  
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Sonora, the Yoreme were troublemakers  but not in Yucatan. Had it 
not been for the Yellow Fever, they would have remained largely ab-
sent from the sources, something unimaginable for Sonora. And in the 
instances they do appear in other types of sources, generally in court 
records, the reasons are usually rather minor ones, generally le-
siones, bodily harm.34 What is really curious about this is that in all 
of the cases found, more than just one Yaqui appears to be involved. 
Usually, they seem to be cases of Yaquis quarreling with other 
Yaquis, mostly in a state of drunkenness. It seems like they kept 
largely to themselves  and to drink  in their exile, even when it 
came to quarreling and fighting. It is these court cases that tell about 
the life of the deported Yoreme, that tell the Yucatecan story most 
clearly. A small but conclusive selection of these will now be exam-
ined. 
In the case of Octaviano Bacasena [Bacasehua], a hacienda 
worker of eighteen years, it was a fight between him and his com-
pañeros de trabajo, also presumably Yoreme.35 Bacasena, a native of 
Alamos (Sonora) worked on the hacienda Cancachén, Augustín Matos 
[Matus?], the victim, was a servant del señor ingeniero David 
Casares.36 On October 17, 1907, around eight oclock at night, Ba-
casena and three of his compañeros were drinking together. As the 
victim, Augustín Matos, recalled, they had been drinking together and 
talking to Antonio Valencia when something he, Matos, said caused 
Bacasena to get mad at him and to lash out with a bottle and hurt him. 
Octaviano Bacasena himself claimed that he thought Matos wanted to 
                                                     
34  The Court records are sometimes subdivided into criminal and civil cases. On the 
whole, the archive is still very disorganized. For Justicia, there is no index and 
so that I had to limit my search to two sample years (1908 and 1912) for reasons 
of sheer magnitude of the documents to be examined for every year. 1908 was 
supposed to be the high point of the deportations, which had been going on for 
several years already. Thus the probability to find material was comparatively 
high. The second reason was the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910/11. 
Thus by 1912, changes should have manifested themselves in the sources. The 
names are given in the spelling found in the sources, with the correct spelling in 
brackets. 
35  The identification of Yaquis can only be a tentative one, based on whatever 
information available, in this and the following cases primarily on names and 
places of origin. 
36  AGEY, Fondo Justicia, 1908, caja 704. Later in the document, Bacasena is also 
called a servant of the finca Cancachén, of which Casares was the proprietor. 
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fight with yet another man, Villanueva, and that this was the reason 
why he went over to him. This was the only time the name Villanueva 
appears in the documentation. There may have been another, previ-
ously unmentioned person present or the writer may have confused the 
name of Antonio Valencia, who had also been present.37 The fact re-
mains that Bacasena stated Matos to have been drunk and that the 
latter had wanted to fight with someone, be this Valencia or Villa-
nueva. According to his own statement Bacasena only wanted to in-
tervene. The witnesses, Ignacio Molina and Antonio Valencia, did not 
throw any more light on the matter and just claimed to ignore the rea-
son for the falling-out. In the end, Octaviano Bacasena was sentenced 
to 24 days of arrest and was to cover the costs of the trial. 
In June of 1908, Francisca Loor Ségua received a sentence of 
64 [69] days of arrest. A native of Hermosillo (Sonora), she by that 
time lived on the hacienda Fanil [Tanil] where she did female work. 
Francisca was 40 or 44 years old and married. The document states 
that Francisca, the woman or maybe the wife (mujer) of José Salazar, 
was accused for bodily harming the mujer of a man named José María 
Mendoza.38 The incident happened on the same hacienda, Fanil 
[Tanil], where they all lived. Again, we do have confusion about the 
names of one of the persons involved, probably because the typical 
Yaqui names sounded more than strange to Yucatecan ears. First, the 
defendant was referred to as Francisca Flores until she explicitly 
stated her name to be Francisca Loor Ségua. In the following, a veri-
table drama of love, hate, and jealousy between exiled Yoreme un-
folded. The victim, Luz Yoqihua, reported that Francisca came to her 
house at ten oclock in the morning and simply attacked her with a 
chisel. Luz cried for help and a female neighbor came to her aid. 
Francisca herself readily admitted to the attack and explained that it 
happened in revenge for a beating she herself had received from her 
husband a week before. In addition, her husband was having an affair 
with Luz Yoqihua, angering Francisca doubly. So she took the oppor-
tunity when she knew Luz to be home alone, to give her what she 
deserved.39 Luz wounds were not grave. But what really spoke for 
                                                     
37  Parts of the documentation have been severely damaged by water and/or fungi 
destroying the paper. 
38  AGEY, Fondo Justicia, 1908, caja 704. 
39  [] le fue a dar su merecido; AGEY, Fondo Justicia, 1908, caja 704. 
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Francisca was that Luz was suffering from a venereal disease which 
Franciscas husband had contracted through her and passed it on to his 
wife. Luz herself had been in such a bad condition on account of this 
disease that in May she had had to be hospitalized. This and the light 
character of the wounds inflicted on Luz were factors in favor of 
Francisca. The sentence eventually passed was 69 days of arrest. Be-
cause of good conduct, part of it was lifted. 
While the court cases involving Yaquis are more than scarce with 
only two criminal offenses by Yoreme in 1908  and one of them even 
with the crime having taken place in 1907  two more can be found in 
1912.40 In both, the offense was bodily harm, in one instance commit-
ted by a man, in the other by a woman. And the people involved can 
clearly and without any doubt or the use of circumstantial evidence be 
identified as Yaquis. 
The first appearance of Yoreme in a Yucatecan court in 1912 was 
about such a fight among two Yaquis. At the bottom of the occur-
rences in the month of May was the jornalero yaqui Miguel 
Buitimea, who had been attacked by his compatriot Fidencio Alvarado 
Fodo.41 Buitimea was 40 years old, married, and from Magdalena 
(Sonora). He in 1912 worked and lived on the finca San Ignacio. Al-
varado, his attacker, was 26, unmarried, originally from Tórin (Sono-
ra) and residing on the same hacienda. Both men were drunk when 
they coincided. Alvarado was reported to have said voy a chingar al 
yaqüi, voy a matarlo.42 The two fought and Buitimea was knocked 
down. He claimed to have had no chance because he was intoxicated 
while Alvarado was sober. Apparently there were some bystanders but 
none known to Miguel Buitimea. The latter added that he believed 
Alvarado to have been fed up with the work for a while, disgustado 
por trabajo.43 In contrast to what Buitimea had told, Alvarado also 
admitted to having been under the influence. In any case, the fight 
resulted in Buitimea having the tip of his nose bitten off by Alvarado. 
                                                     
40  In addition to the criminal cases mentioned, there are four cases of orphaned 
Yaquis in 1908 and two in 1912.  
41  AGEY, Justicia, 1912, caja 870.  
42  Here, the statement is very ambiguous. It could also have been Buitimea making 
this utterance. In that case he would have initiated the fight himself and that pro-
bably would have resulted in a much shorter sentence for Alvarado. 
43  AGEY, Justicia, 1912, caja 870. 
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The defendant claimed to remember nothing of the fight itself but that 
his wife had later told him about it. The court made an attempt at ob-
taining her for a statement but she seemed to have left the finca. In-
deed, she may have been among those who left the haciendas in 1912, 
making their way to Mérida and presumably also to Progreso (Padilla 
Ramos 1995: 156). With all probability, these Yaquis, set free by the 
Revolution, were trying to escape the fincas and, maybe, to return to 
their native Sonora. Apparently, other Yaquis were also missing from 
the same finca.44. Alvarado was released from prison in August.  
In the court proceedings against María de la Luz Flores, taking 
place in January of 1912, we have not only a case of Yaquis fighting 
among themselves but also of a couple quarreling. The whole affair 
puzzled the court so much, that it was investigated repeatedly. It was 
assumed that Luz had wounded her spouse with a knife but since she 
was also injured the investigators were doubtful about what had actu-
ally happened. The defendant, Luz, was a widow, originally from 
Sonora, and thirty years old. As it turned out in the course of the hear-
ings, she had been living with the victim, Juan Fierros, for seven 
years, presumably always on the same hacienda, Tixnuc. Upon ques-
tioning, she stated that they had never legalized their relationship, 
which in the following was therefore referred to by the court as a 
concubinato. Juan was 26, unmarried, and also from Sonora. Upon 
him, four large wounds had been inflicted and, when questioned, he 
stated that his spouse Luz had caused these. He claimed the weapon to 
have been an axe, not a knife, and the woman to have been drunk. He 
also said that there had been no falling-out with her and that he could 
not explain her behavior to himself. Luz, however, reported not to 
know who had attacked and wounded Juan. Since she had been com-
pletely drunk she could not remember anything. Luz and a friend had 
been drinking with another woman, who was clearly identified as 
Yaqui.  
Several witnesses, neighbors and friends, were questioned, all of 
them Yaquis, but no one could throw any light on the matter. Conse-
quently, Luz was questioned yet again and stated that Juan had hurt 
her a few days earlier, in an attempt to kill her with a knife. So the 
knife wounds were explained. Later on, both Juan and Luz seemed to 
                                                     
44  Están fuera de la finca  los referidos yaquis; AGEY, Justicia, 1912, caja 881. 
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have agreed that he had only wanted to scare and not to hurt or kill 
her. But, in an attempt to take the knife off him, she still had been 
injured. Once talking, she also reported that he had been speaking 
about leaving her and about going back á su tierra by himself. He 
had told her he did not want to be with her anymore. Finally, she also 
admitted that she did believe to have hurt him with the axe referred to 
earlier. She explained that when drunk, she always got very sad, cried, 
and remembered the children she had in Hermosillo and the one child 
who had died.  
That along with the physical and emotional hurt Juan had caused 
her had finally brought her to the brink and, together with her intoxi-
cation, was the cause for attacking him. If the judge thought her story 
touching cannot be ascertained, neither can the penalty she received.45 
Luz was released from prison in March of 1912. 
Especially the latter two cases are very revealing about the situati-
on the Yoreme faced on Yucatan. The work must have been very hard 
and the life probably equally unappealing. Many died. The deportees 
had hardly any contacts to other workers on the haciendas. This may 
have been due to the language barrier  as some of the Yoreme hardly 
spoke any Spanish, let alone Maya  or it could have been by choice. 
Maybe by isolating themselves they somehow tried to keep up their 
sense of identity. What is pretty obvious is the fact that even the figh-
ting seems to have been limited to the exiled Yoreme, instead of a-
gainst workers of other ethnicities or even the hacendados or their 
representatives.46 The reasons for this isolation could well have been 
much more complex, too. Since there are virtually no documents from 
the deportees themselves, it will not be possible to ascertain what real-
ly went on. What the existing documents do tell us is that the Yaquis 
seem to have given up their struggle once they had been removed 
from their native Sonora, or better from their traditional territory and 
that they largely stuck to themselves. Only this explains the almost 
complete absence of other cases like riots or uprisings by Yaquis  as 
were typical for Sonora at the same time. Instead, many of the depor-
                                                     
45  She may have benefited from his opinion that she did not profit from her deed, 
no hubo ventaja por parte de la heridora. As in most cases, parts of the docu-
ment have been destroyed; AGEY, Justicia, 1912, caja 881. 
46  The exception being a brief outbreak of hostilities in 1911. See Raquel Padilla 
Ramos forthcoming book. 
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tees seem to have sought refuge in alcohol, as the cases at hand prove. 
Still, they kept their sense of (ethnic) identity as becomes apparent 
from their clear self-identification as Yaquis, as found repeatedly in 
the sources.  
Through the case of María de la Luz Flores we gain insights into 
the situation many Yoreme faced and learn how they might have felt. 
Luz is far removed from her home in Sonora. She was widowed, 
maybe through the ongoing guerilla fight in Sonora or even the very 
deportations. Her children were presumably still in Hermosillo and, 
quite naturally, she missed them unbearably, even though, or maybe 
because, she has been away from them for at least seven years. 
Another child of hers had apparently died and she still had not gotten 
over the loss. It seems like she had kept her sadness under control for 
the longest time but it resurfaced and overwhelmed her when her 
situation changes again drastically. With the revolution, changes were 
also brought to Yucatan and consequently many, maybe most, Yaquis 
left the haciendas, as becomes evident from the boletines of that time 
and from the case of Buitimea and Alvarado. And Luz spouse, Juan, 
did also talk about leaving  leaving the state and leaving her. He 
wanted to return to Sonora and threatened her with not taking her 
along. Luz may or may not have loved Juan, but he had given her 
some security over the past years, a sense of belonging. All of a 
sudden she was faced with being abandoned and being alone once 
again, with losing what little she has retained without gaining 
anything in return. She may have feared that by herself she would 
never make it home and therefore never to see her children and her 
home again. All of this completely overwhelmed her when her de-
fenses were lowered by alcoholic intoxication. And in this situation 
she did lose control and both she and Juan got hurt in the process. Yet 
for us this was a most fortunate occurrence since it prompted a court 
action and her to testify in the course of it. Thus Luz is one of the very 
few voices telling the Yucatecan story  a story very different from 
the Sonoran one. While some Sonoran Yoreme never stopped 
fighting, it seems like the deportees to Yucatan had ceased to do so.47 
                                                     
47  The possibility that struggled cannot be ruled out entirely. Minor matters were 
probably never known outside the haciendas. 
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So how come the Yaquis, ever troublesome in their native Sonora, 
ceased all their resistance upon their arrival in Yucatan? Unfortu-
nately, there is no clear and conclusive explanation  only guesses. As 
Evelyn Hu-DeHart (1984: 205) has concluded: Deportation created a 
new, much more severe kind of diaspora, which saw not only individ-
ual Yaquis flung farther afield than ever but communities and families 
torn apart as well, that caused the legendary Yaqui stamina finally to a 
near breaking point. Power and power relations need a base, an ideo-
logical and/or a more tangible one. This base lacked in Yucatan, along 
with feasible perspectives for the deportees and therefore the resis-
tance could not be kept up. The will to resist came back with the pos-
sibility to go home to Sonora, when, after outbreak of Revolution, the 
Yaquis left the haciendas, hoping to return to their native land, trying 
to regain their base of power. 
In Sonora, on the other hand, the deportations may even have 
given the Yaquis an additional incentive to fight  the demand that 
the deportees be returned  along with the traditional demand for 
autonomy. 
Thus the question about the Yaquis base of power is not an easy 
one to answer, especially since there is not much evidence to judge 
from. My guess would be that it was a combination of land and com-
munity, and religion from which the Yaquis derived their strength and 
their will to resist and to keep up the fight. This might explain why 
there is no single Yaqui story but different and differing ones.  
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